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SUMMARIES 
B. Riemann (1826-1866) knew a great deal of the 
thought of the German philosopher J. Fr. Herbart (1776- 
1841). During his studies of the philosopher's work 
he copied out numerous excerpts and made a few notes 
which are preserved (at least partially) in the 
Riemann Archiv at Gattingen. This material reveals 
that Herbart influenced Riemann much more in his 
epistemology and the comprehension of science than in 
his particular philosophy of space and spatial think- 
ing. Thus the relationship between Herbart and Riemann 
has to be looked upon as an example of an influence of 
German Bildungsphilosophie on the mathematics of the 
19th century. 
Bekanntlich befasste sich B. Riemann (1826-1866) 
griindlich mit der Philosophie J. Fr. Herbarts (1776- 
1841). Er fertigte wahrend seiner Herbart-Studien 
umfangreiche Exzerpte und einige Notizen an, die 
(zumindest teilweise) im Gijttinger Riemann Archiv 
erhalten sind. Dem Inhalt dieser Materialien nach zu 
schlieben lag der Schwerpunkt des Herbartschen 
Einflusses auf Riemann nicht so sehr in seiner Philo- 
Sophie des Raumes und des r&mlichen Denkens als 
vielmehr im Bereich der Erkenntnistheorie und Wissen- 
schaftsauffassung. Gerade darin stellt sich aber die 
Beziehung zwischen Herbart und Riemann als Fallbeispiel 
eines Einflusses der deutschen Bildungsphilosophie auf 
die Mathematik des 19. Jahrhunderts dar. 
Bernhard Riemann was one of the most influential mathema- 
ticians of the last century, working in mathematical fields as 
different as complex function theory, partial differential equa- 
tions, foundations of Fourier analysis, topology, differential 
geometry, birational geometry, and number theory [Dieudonne 
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1978, Klein 1926, Kline 19721. His work, although small in 
volume, had a strong impact on later researchers. Because of 
its deep conceptual penetration of the subject matter in question, 
it became a source of inspiration when the tendency of mathema- 
tics toward a clarification of the underlying main concepts be- 
came stronger in the second half of the 19th century [l]. Thus 
it is of interest to investigate the background of Riemann's 
research related to problems of conceptual structure. 
Riemann's published works contain philosophical fragments 
[1892a, 509 ff.] which shed some light upon his reflections 
about science. They also provide evidence that Riemann was 
strongly influenced by the philosopher Johann Friedrich Herbart, 
who had been teaching at Kdnigsberg and Gdttingen until his 
death in 1841 (see Appendix la). Riemann stated: 
The author [Riemann himself] is a Herbartian in 
psychology and epistemology (methodology and eidolology); 
in most cases, however, he cannot agree with Herbart's 
natural philosophy and the metaphysical disciplines 
(ontology and synechology) referring to it. [1892a, 5081 
This statement has been cited often, and so some influence 
of Herbart on Riemann is generally assumed in the literature 
[Russell 1956, 62 f.; Torretti 1978, 107 f.; Scholz 1980, 94-951. 
But there have been differences of opinion over which of Herbart's 
ideas were most influential. Russell believed that it was 
Herbart's philosophy (and psychology) of space which made a deep 
impact on Riemann. That would not correspond to the contents of 
the citation above, however, because "synechology" [Synechologie] 
was Herbart's name for the philosophical foundation of the con- 
cept of space, and this was exactly one of the points Riemann 
said had failed to convince him. But this alone will not justify 
rejecting Russell's statement without further consideration, for 
it gains some plausibility from a similarity between Riemann's 
explanation of the concept of manifold and Herbart's "serial 
forms" (see below). Torretti's discussion of the topic agrees 
essentially with that of Russell, although he does not find all 
of it acceptable. In (implicit) contrast to this, Schnlz [1980] 
looks for the link between Herbart and Riemann much more on the 
general level of epistemology, which, again, played a distinct 
role in Riemann's formation of the concept of manifold. 
But all of these estimations suffer from the limitation of 
the material on which they are founded. On the basis of the 
published works of Riemann and Herbart one couldrdo no more than 
try to make reasonable guesses. But the Riemann Nachlass at 
Gijttingen mniversity library contains excerpts and notes from 
Riemann's studies of Herbart, which give a clearer picture than 
before of Herbart's philosophy and how it was of particular 
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interest to Riemann. This article presents this previously 
unpublished material, discusses the most essential points of 
Herbart's philosophy to which Riemann responded, and finally 
offers a short evaluation which might point to questions for 
further investigations. 
THE MATERIAL 
Folder 18 of Riemann's Nachlass contains 203 sheets with 
manuscripts classified as "Fragmente naturphilosophischen 
Inhalts"; but there are at least 12 sheets with notes and ex- 
cerpts from Riemann's studies of Herbart (numbers 57, 59, 60, 
64, 66, 70, 72, 73, 90, 140, 141, 171) [2]. The excerpts are 
taken from Herbart's works on metaphysics and psychology 
[Herbart 1796, 1799, 1811, 1812, 1822, 1824, 1825, 18281. In 
addition, there is a note (R.177) [3] with references to 
[Herbart 18071 and another (R.141) with references to [Herbart 
18511. 
Herbart distinguished two large fields of philosophy, meta- 
physics and aesthetics and practical philosophy. Metaphysics, 
according to Herbart, contained four disciplines: Methodology, 
eidolology [Eidolologie], ontology, and synechology [Synecho- 
logic] . 
Trained in the philosophy of Kant and Fichte, he saw the 
goal of philosophy and the sciences as advancing from contra- 
dictory sense perceptions to concepts of the underlying reality. 
This advancement he believed should be governed by sound princi- 
ples of methodology. His thorough studies of Fichte's philos- 
ophy of the self led Herbart to the insight that the self was 
one of the most subtle concepts of philosophy, endowed with a 
multitude of contradictions (see Appendix la). To show this, 
and to come to grips with it, was the task of the discipline 
he called eidolology. Methodology and eidolology together can 
be looked upon (as did Riemann in the citation above) as forming 
Herbart's epistemology. The most general categories of reality 
(for Herbart: being [Sein], quality, inherence, and change) 
formed the subject matter of his ontology. However, this was 
not yet sufficient as a foundation for scientific investigation 
and had to be completed by generation of the concepts of space, 
time, number, and matter, which was done in the discipline of 
synechology [Weiss 19281. 
Thematically, all four disciplines of Herbart's metaphysics 
are covered by Riemann's excerpts, whereas aesthetics and prac- 
tical philosophy are touched upon only marginally (e.g., R.60r). 
Table 1 provides a list of the most important of these excerpts 
with reference to topic, source (in Herbart's Werke) , discipline 
in Herbart's classification of metaphysics, and folio number 
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TABLE 1 
Survey of Riemann's excerpts from Herbart in folder 18 
of Riemann's Nachlass, Handschriftenabteilung 
Universit;itsbibliothek Gijttingen 
Subject matter 
Excerpt from Folio 
Herbart (fol.der 18) 
(i) Methodology 
Philosophical concepts as 
changing products of thought 
Reality lying behind per- 
ceptions 
Reality lying behind per- 
ceptions 
Method of relations 
(ii) Eidolology 
Schelling's dialectics of 
the self 
Herbart's explanation of 
the self 
Herbart's criticism of 
Fichte's self 
(iii) Ontology 
Things as bundles of 
properties 
Substance as understood by 
Leibniz, Locke, and Kant 
Farreaching character of 
change of chemical sub- 
stances 
Difficulties of Greek phi- 
losophers with contradic- 
tions of change 
Causality 
Causality 
(iv) Synechology 
Serial forms 
Serial forms 
Objective basis of space 
imagination 
[1825, 198/199] 
[1825, 199/200] 
[1828, 123/124] 
[1851, 594-5961 
11796, 30/31] 64r 
[1799, 108-1101 64v 
[1822, 107/108] 64v 
[1825, 1931 
11825, 193/l.94, 1963 
[1828, 130/131] 
[1828, 134,'135, 330- 
334, 337, 3401 
[1825, 115, 424/425] 
[1828, 1221 
[1825, 192/193] 
[1824, 428, 4211 
[1824, 4251 
Criticism of Kant's idea of 
space [1824, 4281 
5gr 
5gv 
66r 
5gr 
72', 73v 
7ov 
72+ 
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in Riemann's Nachlass, folder 18. Apart from the excerpts 
there are three notes by Riemann referring to Herbart (R-140, 
141, 177). They are documented in Appendix 2 and note 17. 
An analysis of the excerpt material and the additional notes 
shows that there are certain points in Herbart's philosophy 
which seemed of particular importance to Riemann: elements of 
dialectics, methodology, spatial concepts, and the orientation 
of mathematical research. These points are discussed in the 
following sections, in order to draw a picture of Herbart's 
influence on Riemann. 
ELEMENTS OF DIALECTICS 
Philosophy of the Self (eidolology) 
Riemann came into contact with Fichte's and Schelling's 
philosophy of the self by way of the early works of Herbart 
[1796, 1799, R.641. At the beginnings of his studies (1794), 
Herbart had been one of Fichte's main disciples and was fasci- 
nated by the idea of the "absolute self" as the basis for cog- 
nition of all of reality [Asmus 1968, 98 ff.]. But already 
during the final phase of his studies (1795/1796) he developed-- 
in his criticism of Fichte's idea--the foundations of his own 
philosophy of the self, which he later called eidolology. 
Herbart's argument was based on the observation that the 
conception of the self always contained in itself the contra- 
diction between the act of reflection and the reflected, and 
so in Fichte's terminology of the self and the not-self [Ich 
und Nicht-Ich]. This contradiction, however, served him as 
proof that the self was no simple idea; on the contrary, it was 
one of the richest and most concrete concepts, and so could not 
be the starting point for philosophy. This led him to regard 
Fichte's "absolute self" as an idealist fiction [Herbart 1822, 
107-108*; 1824, 237 ff.] [41. The self seemed to him to be a 
bundle of properties [Complexion von Merkmalen] [1828, 209/210] 
and, according to Herbart, it contained a fluctuating structure 
of ideas or presentations [Vorstellungen] opposed to each other 
and impeding one another [1799, 108 f.*]. This appeared to him 
to be important because he regarded the process of gaining 
knowledge as governed not only by the principles of methodology 
but also by the laws of the movement and impediments of presen- 
tations. 
Riemann excerpted the essential points of Herbart's argu- 
mentation, was obviously convinced by it, and adopted the basic 
features of the philosopher's eidolology/psychology. This, al- 
ready stated in the citation above, is made completely clear by 
a note in which Riemann summarized Herbart's position in his 
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own words, expressing what he felt were its most important 
aspects (R.140; see Appendix 2): 
1. Presentations are the elementary forces of the soul. 
They oppose and impede each other. The resulting antagonisms 
generate the movement of thought. 
2. Images of the outside world are generated by negations 
of the given perceptions. Negation itself has to be learned 
from the experience of cancellation of presentations. 
3. Negation is canceled and a new position gained, when a 
connection with the already formed and interdependent images/ 
concepts is attained. 
Riemann thus came to know and accept certain elements of 
Herbart's dialectics in his reception of such eidolology: op- 
position of concepts/presentations, negation, and position as 
canceled negation. 
In his published philosophical fragments we find a passage 
in which he experimented with a conceptual structure of thesis/ 
antithesis [1892a, 518 ff.]. Previously it was unclear what 
his background was for expressing this idea. Now I think an 
answer can be given: Riemann's knowledge of certain aspects of 
Fichte's and Schelling's dialectical philosophy came through his 
studies of Herbart, although Riemann was not directly influenced 
by their philosophy. Nevertheless, he adopted basic features 
of a dialectical character from Herbart's philosophy, from 
eidolology in particular. It was German philosophy of the first 
half of the 19th century, which Riemann encountered by way of 
his Herbart studies, that set the background for his own dialec- 
tical arguments. 
The Problem of Change and the Structure of the Real 
Riemann studied Herbart's historical treatise on metaphysics 
from the Greeks to Schelling and Fries [Herbart 18281 with in- 
terest and made long excerpts from this work (R.64, 66), includ- 
ing a long passage about Plato (R.66). Herbart explained that 
Plato, once he stumbled upon the contradiction lying in change 
as a form of experience, made a strange [ungereimt] distinction 
between the world of knowledge containing eternal ideas and the 
world of opinions dealing with changing phenomena. 
According to Herbart, Plato tried to mitigate the strange- 
ness of the sharp opposition of these two worlds by assuming 
a substance without any qualities, which, shaped by ideas, would 
generate the changing things of the sensual world (Herbart 1828, 
330 f.*]. Herbart, and with him Riemann, traced a line of fol- 
lowers who somehow adopted this conception, although with modi- 
ficatons, which ran from Aristotle [Herbart 1828, 134 f.*] to 
the scholastics [1828, 323 f.*], Spinoza, and even to Schelling 
[1828, 135*]. 
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In contrast to these philosophers Herbart saw a much closer 
connection between changing phenomena and the real. He was sure 
that criticism of the phenomena could lead to knowledge about 
"the real" [das Reale] [5], and he set himself the task of 
structuring that knowledge according to the connections of the 
phenomena. This was the responsibility of metaphysics as Herbert 
understood it, but metaphysics had to do more. Once it had pen- 
etrated into the depths of "the real," it had to rise again, in 
order to distinguish "the given" (the phenomena) from "the real" 
as far as possible. This movement of thought, compared by him 
to an arc, ought to be governed by the principles of methodology 
[1829, 141. 
Riemann was obviously interested in this type of argument. 
He copied out the following explanations of Herbart point by 
point: 
In the first place, according to Herbart, experience shows 
us properties and bundles [Complexionen] of properties, the 
underlying reality of which must first be sought in things to 
which the properties are ascribed [1825, 199*]. But the next 
step of the analysis, so he continued, led investigators to the 
elements of Greek philosophy, from which the things now obtained 
a "borrowed reality" [geliehene Realitat, 1825, 1991. Later 
the scientists' analysis led to the introduction of chemical 
elements from which now the old elements (at least water and 
air, which Herbart explicitly referred to) were derived. Finally 
idealist philosophy came, according to Herbart, and reduced even 
chemical elements, as well as properties, things, and old ele- 
ments, to intuition [Anschauung] and thought, concluding that 
the idea of the self underlay all other concepts and "lent real- 
ity" to them [Herbart 1825, 2001 [6]. 
We see from this argument that Herbart did not restrict his 
reflections to metaphysics proper but also included science. 
This goes hand in hand with his opinion concerning the relation- 
ship between philosophy and science, which rejected a sharp 
dividing line between the two. 
From Riemann's selection of passages we may conclude that 
he was particularly interested in the question of how the problem 
of change and its consequences for the structure of reality had 
been tackled in metaphysics [7]. He noted Herbart's conceptions 
of things as bundles [Complexionen] of properties (R.59), behind 
which lay the real [Herbart 1828, 199-2001. But the specific 
construction of "the real" as proposed by Herbart is not refleced 
in Riemann excerpts. This corresponds perfectly well with his 
declaration that he did not agree with the philosopher's ontol- 
WY - The distinction, however, between the phenomena and a 
more stable underlying reality with an intense relationship be- 
tween both became an essential point in Riemann's own reflections 
about the epistemology of science [1892b]. 
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THE PROCESS OF KNOWLEDGE (METHODOLOGY) 
Riemann adopted Herbart's idea of the two-phase movement 
("arc") for the advancement of knowledge (see above), although 
he preferred a terminology which was closer to that of scientific 
research than to that of metaphysics. So in a note which can be 
looked upon as an intermediate paper coming somewhere between 
the pure Herbart study and his own epistemological essay [1892b], 
he characterized these two phases in the following way: 
1. Formation of concepts from perceptions 
--abstraction and induction, synthesis a posteriori 
2. Generation of the perceived from the concepts 
--synthesis a priori. [R.l41; see Appendix 21 
Obviously Riemann did not mean what Kant did by synthesis a 
priori. He had a relative a priori in mind, which, serving as 
a conceptual framework for experience, presupposed the other 
half of the whole process of knowledge (abstraction and induc- 
tion). Thus the historical change of concepts was not only 
possible but was to be achieved as follows: 
3. Change (or completion) of the concepts as small as 
possible, where the perceived is impossible or 
unlikely according to the concepts. [R. 1413 
It seemed to him that Herbart's "method of relations" which 
dealt with the dialectics of reason and consequence (see Appendix 
lb) was useful for accomplishing this change. 
This was not the only reference to Herbart, showing that 
Riemann's ideas about change of concepts were partially due to 
the philosopher. He also referred to Sections 139-145 of Herbart's 
"Science of Psychology" [1825] from which he made long excerpts 
(R.59). There he noted in particular that Herbart looked upon 
changes of ideas about reality resulting from the solution of 
contradictions as conceptual revolutions similar to those in 
astronomical knowledge [Herbart 1825, 198*], thus considering 
the process of knowledge as a stepwise acquisition of levels in 
the intellectual evolution of man [Bildungsstufen . . . . welche 
successiv erreicht werden, Herbart 1825, 199*] [8]. 
It seems clear, then, that two important features of Riemann's 
developmental dialectics as proposed in his published epistemo- 
logical fragment [1892b] were due to Herbart: 
--a distinction between the phenomena and the underlying 
reality with a corresponding difference between the perception 
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and the conceptual acquisition of reality; the latter had "to 
go back behind the phenomena" and according to Riemann could 
thus serve as a base for an explanation of the former; 
--a belief in progress of knowledge by "transformation of 
older conceptual systems" because of contradictions on the level 
of the explanations or between concepts and phenomena. 
But Riemann's presentation differed in three points from 
that of Herbart [Scholz 1980, 94-961: 
--Riemann referred mainly to the sciences, whereas Herbart 
had investigated both metaphysics and science, with a clear 
emphasis on the former. 
--Riemann was therefore able to integrate the materialist 
criterion of truth, corresponding to the tradition of science, 
much more clearly into his essay. According to Riemann know- 
ledge was true if the connection of the concepts corresponded 
to the connection of things, which again was to be deciphered 
from the connection of the percieved phenomena [Riemann 189213, 
5231. 
--Finally, Herbart had considered the historical change of 
concepts (mainly in ontology) to have been a chain of errors 
[1825, 198 ff., partially cited in note [8]]. Riemann, looking 
at the development of scientific knowledge, expressed a dif- 
ferent point of view. He declared that the relationship of new 
knowledge about a certain sector of reality to older knowledge 
of the same sector was not necessarily that of correction and 
error. He stated that modification of conceptual structure was 
also possible, which only refined the conceptual elements of 
the old system without falsification of part or all of them [9]. 
Thus, when Riemann called himself a "Herbartian in episte- 
mology , ” he meant that he had not only adopted certain central 
features of Herbart's epistemology, but that he had also assim- 
ilated the latter into the tradition of science, which enriched 
it by a scientific materialist component. 
SPATIAL CONCEPTS 
Kant's conception of fixed and a priori deducible categories 
of space and time were criticized by later philosophers of German 
idealism (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schleiermacher). In this 
respect Herbart was no different. "Historical change of concepts" 
was used by Herbart as a strong argument against the opinion 
that the fundamental concepts of reality were inborn concepts 
or categories, an argument obviously directed against Kantian 
philosophy. To the contrary he stressed that concepts were 
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changing products of thought [1825, 198*], including those that 
served as "forms of experience" and as such had the very function 
of Kant's categories [Herbart 1829, 211. 
Riemann agreed with Herbart's refutation of Kant's episte- 
mology [1892b, 5221, although we find little evidence in his 
excerpts of a specific interest in Herbart's explicit discus- 
sions of Kant. But in one of them (R.72) we find a short polem- 
ical argument in that direction. In it the idea of space and 
time as "empty vessels . . . in which the senses ought to pour 
their perceptions" was criticized as "a completely shallow, 
meaningless, and inappropriate [vbllig gehaltlose, nichtssagende, 
unpassende] hypothesis" [Herbart 1824, 428*]. It seems that 
Riemann thought the question was settled on this point, and was 
not very much interested in the detailed philosophical argument 
that dealt with Kant. 
Herbart claimed that, like all concepts which served as 
"forms of experience,n spatial concepts had their origin in 
experience, but then had to be shaped and developed by philo- 
sophical and scientific thinking. Spatial presentations are 
formed on this level by the perceptions of things due to the 
"mobility of man in his neighbourhood" [1824, 425*]. so 'I.. . 
the series of presentations [Vorstellungsreihen], which eventu- 
ally form, order, and connect themselves and in which the order 
of perceptions is contained [aufbewahrt]," come into being [lo]. 
Space and time were Herbart's starting point for generating 
more general "continuous serial forms" [continuierliche Reihen- 
formen] of concepts. The explanation of the latter was a very 
complicated procedure, part of the discipline of metaphysics 
that he called synechology [Herbart 1829, 110-158; Weiss 1928, 
50-571. Riemann's excerpts suggest that he did not bother 
about specific procedures to generate "serial forms," although 
he was interested in how all of this related to Herbart's geo- 
metrical thinking, because the very general idea made it possi- 
ble to transfer spatial concepts into a nongeometric context. 
Vaguely speaking, a continuous "serial form" is produced 
when a specified class of presentations undergoes a "graded 
fusion" [abgestufte Verschmelzung] through which the correspond- 
ing presentations are ordered, so that one cannot but unite 
them in a spatial mode [Herbart 1825, 192*] [ill. 
Consequently, Space did not exist for Herbart; instead 
there was a collection of spaces for which the modes of exis- 
tence were completely different [1812, 2071. His two main 
examples were the "line of sound" [Tonlinie] and the color tri- 
angle with blue, red, and yellow at the corners and the mixing 
colors in the two-dimensional continuum in between [1825, 193*] 
[121. Similarly he considered any thing as a "bundle [Complexion 
of properties," each property of which ought to be thought of 
as lying in a different "qualitative continuum" [1825, 193*]. 
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In this respect Herbart showed a strong affinity to the 
scholastic philosophers, in particular to Nicole Oresme 
[Clagett 19681. Moreover, the idea of geometrizing any "thing" 
in that way put Herbart (like Oresme) on the very fringe of 
higher-dimensional thinking, because there was no intrinsic 
reason to geometrize only those "things" which could be analyzed 
by a collection of no more than three properties. Herbart stop- 
ped exactly at this barrier and claimed a limitation of spatial 
thinking to three dimensions 11812, 2081. In this respect he 
did not go beyond scholastic philosophy. 
Because such general aspects of Herbart's ideas about serial 
forms are reflected in Riemann's excerpts (R.59, 73), it is im- 
portant to determine how important Herbart's transfer of space- 
like ideas into nongeometric concepts was for Riemann's inclin- 
ation to make a similar transfer inside mathematics. 
To start with, it is worth noting a difference of opinion 
between Riemann and Herbart. When Herbart analyzed things as 
bundles of properties, he emphasized that any such property 
could be understood as a "qualitative continuum" [Herbart 1825, 
193*] (cited in R.59). The background for the transfer of geo- 
metric thinking to other concepts was a very broad, nearly uni- 
versal one for him [13]. Riemann stated exactly the contrary 
in his inaugural lecture, namely, that "in general life" concepts 
of continuous magnitudes (which would correspond to Herbart's 
continuous serial froms) were encountered only very rarely, but 
that in mathematics they arose often [Riemann 1892a, 2741. 
The latter remark refers to a tendency in mathematics of 
the first part of the 19th century to transfer geometrical lan- 
guage to algebraic or analytical systems of several variables, 
a tendency which was at least partially known to Riemann via 
Gauss [Scholz 1980, 15 ff., 53 ff.] and which was independent 
of Herbartian philosophy. From Riemann's very clear remark 
about the dominance of mathematics in the total range of exten- 
sion for the concept of continuous magnitude (manifold), we may 
draw the conclusion that again it was this mathematical tendency 
to transfer geometric thinking to nongeometric fields which was 
the dominant background of his concept formation. 
This conclusion is corroborated by another difference between 
Herbart and Riemann with respect to the connotation (the "in- 
tension" according to Wussing [1967]) of their spatial concepts. 
Herbart adhered strictly to the traditional dimensional barrier 
(three), whereas for Riemann's concept of manifold, multidimen- 
sionality was one of the most essential innovations. This 
feature of Riemann's thought was again closely linked to the 
mathematical tendency to geometrize nongeometric algebraic and 
analytic systems [Scholz 1980, 15 ff., 88 ff.], and stands in 
strict opposition to Herbart's opinions. 
Thus Herbart's direct influence on Riemann's formation of 
the concept of manifold does not appear to have been very strong. 
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However, Riemann must have found Herbart's philosophical re- 
flections about serial forms of presentations stimulating. He 
may have received very general hints of how to proceed in the 
formation of the concept, fostered by a structural similarity 
between Herbart's geometric arguments and the mathematical ten- 
dency "to geometrize." Moreover, he took up Herbart's idea of 
an objective foundation for the formulation of spatial concepts 
and sharpened it from the point of view of the scientist. He 
did so in proposing to formulate the structure of spatial con- 
cepts as closely as possible according to experimental physical 
evidence. But the essential points of Riemann's concept of 
manifold (multidimensionality, opposition between locally simple 
and globally complex behavior, separation of qualitative aspects 
of extended magnitides from quantitative ones, and the separa- 
tion and interdependence of structures on it [Scholz 1980, 30 
ff., 88 ff.]) had no connection with Herbart's geometric thoughts, 
and Riemann had to elaborate these from the mathematical material. 
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES OF SCIENCE 
The preceding section leads to the conclusion that Herbart's 
direct influence on Riemann's formulation of the concept of 
manifold was of rather limited importance. We must not conclude, 
however, that his overall influence on Riemann was similarly 
restricted. We have already found a much closer connection be- 
tween the two on the level of epistemology (see above), which 
played a role in Riemann's mathematics as much as it dealt with 
the question of how to proceed in research. It might be worth- 
while to ask whether Herbart had some influence on Riemann's 
perception of the goal of mathematics or the task of mathema- 
tical research. 
Some answer may be formulated from the notes Riemann made 
(R.177) in a short evaluation of Herbart's article about philo- 
sophical studies [Herbart 18071. The philosophical studies 
Herbart had in mind involved the elaboration of unity in diver- 
sity; for this he proposed working out a central concept [Haupt- 
begriff] in which this unity was to be reflected for each field 
of study 11807, 231, 2383. 
Whereas the sciences developed only central concepts linked 
to their specific subject matter, it seemed necessary for Herbart 
to form unifying concepts transcending a specific context, and 
this led from philosophical studies of the sciences to philos- 
ophy proper [Philosophie als eigene Wissenschaft]. The task 
of professional philosophy was not just to group the most gen- 
eral unifying concepts worked out by the sciences neatly to- 
gether, but to analyze them and to resolve their intrinsic 
difficulties [Herbart 1807, 2351. To do this he thought it 
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important that philosophy avoid the mistakes of both empiricism 
(as in the philosophies of Hume and Locke) and rationalism 
(Plato, Descartes, Kant, Fichte). He also rejected the concep- 
tion of philosophy as a dominating power "from afar," and had 
a much more dialectical relationship between science and phil- 
osophy in mind: "[philosophy] does not lie outside of other 
knowledge, but constitutes itself with and in the same" [14]. 
Consequently, philosophy and the sciences had to work hand 
in hand. Their mutual aim was to generate many-sidedness of 
education [Bildung] in the "higher leading class." Philosophy 
always depended for its educational influence on "other sciences 
which stand nearer to the professions" [15]. 
The generation of philosophy proper was to be achieved by 
speculation [Herbart 1807, 2371, which Herbart understood in a 
wider sense as meaning "any endeavour to make the way for tran- 
sitions" between concepts [1807, 2751. In a more restricted 
sense speculation ought to show only the necessary connections 
between concepts. In any case, Herbart saw the representation 
of "the real" as the final goal of speculation. So philosophical 
activity (speculation) had a characteristic feature; it had 
concepts as its objects. 
This, so it seemed to Herbart, was the essential difference 
between philosophy and science which dealt with "the given." 
Such distinctions even held for most of mathematics up to his 
time: "Philosophically treated, it [mathematics] becomes part 
of philosophy which had to create a science of quantity [GriSBcn- 
lehre] for its own necessities, if one did not already exist," 
[1807, 2751. For Herbart mathematics stood in even closer re- 
lationship to philosophy than to the rest of the sciences [16]. 
When Riemann made his notes on this treatise [Herbart 18071, 
he summed up the main ideas about "speculation" with a few catch- 
words: 
. . . Speculation = endeavour [Streben] toward resolution of prob- 
lems 
. . . Demonstration of a necessary connection between concepts 
A problem of further specul[-ation] 
..- Philosophy as a science 
General character that it is generated by speculation 
That it takes concepts as its object .._ (R-177) [17]. 
It is likely that Riemann wrote these notes during the prep- 
aration of his inaugural lecture [18], which must have been a 
very important period for his interpretation of the methods and 
goals of mathematics and mathematical sciences. It would there- 
fore be interesting to know why Riemann extracted just these 
features from Herbart's article, especially if the reason is 
related to some structural relationship between Herbart's char- 
acterization of philosophy and Riemann's own thoughts. 
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The similarity, in fact, of the note and Riemann's percep- 
tion of science and mathematics is striking. Riemann character- 
ized science as "the attempt to perceive nature through accurate 
concepts" [1892a, 5211, which proceeded gradually through the 
resolution of problems resulting from contradictions in concepts 
or between concepts and experience. In his opinion mathematics 
had an important share in the formation, development, and ex- 
tension of scientific concepts, resembling very much the task 
Herbart gave philosophy in relation to science. Riemann opened 
his inaugural lecture with questions concerning the "possibility" 
and "necessity" of connections between the basic concepts of 
geometry [1892a, 2721, and he hoped that his new concept of 
manifold would be particularly helpful. 
Moreover the idea of clarifying conceptual structures stood 
at the center of Riemann's investigations throughout his mathe- 
matical work, whether it was complex function theory, geometry, 
or integration. This was true to such an extent that one might 
be tempted to read Herbart's note as providing a characteriza- 
tion of mathematics as Riemann himself would have given: A 
science dealing with concepts generated to solve problems aris- 
ing in the attempt to gain knowledge and to clarify connections 
between already established knowledge ("speculation" in Herbart's 
language). 
Riemann's understanding of the task of mathematics shows a 
striking similarity to the aims of philosophy as understood by 
Herbart, and the latter's characterization of the relationship 
between science and philosophy resembles very much the relation- 
ship between natural science and mathematics as seen by Riemann 
[Scholtz 1980, 96 ff.]. In fact, Riemann's interest in Herbart's 
article [1807] seems to have been the result of his desire to 
clarify his own perception of mathematics in the mirror of phil- 
osophy. 
This is all the more likely since a very close relation be- 
tween mathematics and philosophy was suggested by Herbart in 
the very article summarized by Riemann. According to Herbart, 
mathematics became a part of philosophy if dealt with philo- 
sophically [1807, 2751, and at the beginning of his article, he 
proposed something very much along this line: The mathematician 
feels the call [Beruf] to unveil the spirit of his ingenious 
[geistvoll] formulas [19]. 
It would be difficult to imagine a better characterization 
of Riemann's way of doing mathematics [20]. 
Riemann's views on mathematics seem to have been deepened 
and clarified by his extensive studies of Herbart's philosophy. 
Moreover, without this orientation, Riemann might never have 
formulated his profound and innovative concept of manifold. 
This represents an indirect but nevertheless effective influ- 
ence of Herbart on Riemann's mathematical and (in particular) 
his geometrical thinking. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The foregoing evaluation makes it possible to characterize 
more precisely the influence of Herbart's philosophy on Riemann. 
The assumption that Herbart's philosophy of space had an impor- 
tant impact on Riemann's formulation of the manifold concept 
cannot be confirmed. On the other hand Herbart's epistemology 
and his ideas on the relationship between philosophy and science 
do seem to have influenced Riemann and thus Riemann's perception 
of the task of mathematics. 
In the center of Herbart's philosophizing stood the practical 
problem of the education [Bildung] of man. In this respect he 
was one of the German "Bildungsphilosophen" of the early 19th 
century, most of whom tended toward an idealist and dialectical 
philosophy. Starting from similar origins Herbart shared a 
number of beliefs and goals with the philosophers of German 
idealism (Fichte, Schelling, Humboldt, Schleiermacher, Hegel): 
--the prominent role given to education, 
--the serious attempt to overcome the division between empiricism 
and traditional rationalism, 
--the central parts contradiction and change played as motiva- 
tion for progress in philosophy. 
Nevertheless, Herbart's philosophy had its own particular 
features which distinguished it from that of mainstream German 
idealism in a number of general ways: 
--He assigned an auxiliary role to philosophy with respect to 
the sciences and valued highly the empirical and the mathe- 
matical sciences. 
--His philosophy was of a moderately dialectical realism and 
therefore contrasted sharply with the strictly dialectical 
idealism common in Germany of the time. 
The realism appeared in Herbart's epistemology insofar as 
knowledge was to proceed from experience ("the given") via 
conceptual clarification of the underlying reality to the ex- 
planation of the phenomena. Contradictions played an essential 
role in the progress of thought, but Herbart's goal was a con- 
ceptual system without contradiction [21]. In this respect his 
philosophy was "moderately dialectical," in contrast to stricter 
dialectics which would admit contradiction, not only as a 
driving force for progress, but as a structural element in the 
developed conceptual system as well. 
These three distinguishing features, the auxiliary role of 
philosophy, realism, and moderate dialectics, may have given 
Herbart's thought a greater affinity to science and mathematics 
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than was the case for German idealist philosophy proper. His 
proposal to do mathematics "philosophically" as a science dealing 
with concepts agreed with tendencies in contemporary mathematics, 
and could therefore serve to stimulate Riemann in clarifying 
his ideas about mathematics. Riemann's views about the process 
of gaining knowledge were elaborated to a high degree as a result 
of his studies of Herbart, and were influenced by the dialecti- 
cal elements in Herbart's epistemology. Moreover, they had a 
specific influence on his mathematics. A perception of mathe- 
matics as a science which has to penetrate its object by a clear 
conceptual approach runs throughout Riemann's works like a leit- 
motif. Herbart's proposal to work out a central concept [Haupt- 
begriffl for any field of studies (see above) was realized by 
Riemann most clearly in complex function theory and in geometry. 
He started to reorganize the latter field around the concept of 
manifold, which he also thought to be appropriate for a new 
foundation of physical geometry. 
If it could be shown that Riemann had adapted intensional 
(connotational) features of the concept of manifold from Herbart's 
philosophy of geometry, this would offer direct evidence of an 
"influx" of concrete conceptual elements into mathematics from 
outside, and the influence of philosophy on mathematics would 
have been, in this instance, an "external factor" of concept 
formation. But the situation is different. Herbart's philo- 
sophical conceptions of science and mathematics were assimilated 
by Riemann on a very general level, influencing his ideas as to 
how and in which direction mathematical research ought to pro- 
ceed. In this way he transformed certain features of Herbart's 
philosophy into guiding principles of mathematics which then 
operated in his own work. This was exactly what Herbart had 
expected philosophy could do in relation to science. He re- 
jected philosophy as "light coming from afar" and wanted to 
develop it not outside but in "a thoroughly immanent relation- 
ship to" other knowledge [1807, 2301. 
It might be worthwhile to investigate this type of influence 
of philosophy on mathematical and scientific research in a 
broader scope. In fact, Albert Lewis has already given a de- 
tailed study of a similar relation between a philosopher and a 
mathematician, one very close to Herbart/Riemann in time and 
space, namely, Schleiermacher's influence on H. Grassmann 
[Lewis 19771. Of course, the situations are different. Insofar 
as Grassmann was an outsider, he was hardly recognized by his 
contemporaries and remained unappreciated for most of the 19th 
century, whereas Riemann was very much in the center of mathema- 
tical activity. But the similarities are too striking to be 
overlooked, and it would be a mistake to regard the two cases 
as separate and exceptional examples of the influence of phil- 
osophy on the orientation of mathematical research 1221. Per- 
haps there is a more general relationship underlying the influ- 
ence of Herbart on Riemann or of Schleiermacher on Grassmann. 
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In an investigation of such a relationship we must keep in 
mind that German philosophy of the time was not only a question 
of pure thought. In an attempt to give an intellectual answer 
to questions arising from the confrontation of the results of 
the French revolution with the social and cultural reality of 
Germany at the beginning of the 19th century [23], the problem 
of education [Bildunq] had been posed by German intellectuals, 
and it stood at the very center of contemporary philosophy, 
along with the idealist facing of the development of the self, 
the idea, or the spirit. And this had an influence on the con- 
tents and the structure of their philosophy. 
Herbart's philosophy of education, for example, was of 
crucial importance for the particular relationship philosophy 
should have to the sciences and mathematics (see above). His 
developmental dialectics in epistemology was part of the same 
context. And there seems to have been a common root of Herbart's 
philosophizing and that of the idealists, underlying all their 
specific differences, in the commitment to the problem of edu- 
cation [Bildunq]. 
As this commitment referred directly to the research and 
teaching activities of the professors at the reformed German 
universities, it is better to pose the question of a possible 
relationship between philosophy and mathematics during the first 
part of the 19th century (at least in Prussia and the other 
German states) in an extended and perhaps more fundamental form: 
Could it be that philosophical conceptions, worked out to some 
extent as an attempt to master intellectually the social chal- 
lenges of the early 19th century, have been incorporated into 
mathematics (and science more broadly) as guiding principles of 
research, thus constituting a specific link in the transforma- 
tion of social change into intrinsic developmental factors of 
the scientific process? 
Were this the case, then the relationship between Herbart 
and Riemann would have to be considered as a primary example of 
significant social and philosophical influence on the mathema- 
tical development of the 19th century. 
APPENDIX 1: JOHANN FRIEDRICH HERBART (1776-1841) 
(a) Biographical Note 
Herbart studied law, philosophy, literature, and mathematics 
at Jena from 1794 to 1796. At the time, intellectual circles 
in Germany were heavily influenced by the experience of the 
French revolution. Attempts were made to draw consequences 
adapted to the backward economic and social conditions, as well 
as the philosophical and cultural context in Germany [Lassahn 
1978, 31 ff.]. Herbart was deeply impressed by Fichte's phil- 
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osophy and became for a while one of his main disciples [Asmus 
1968, 98-1071. But by the end of his studies he had developed 
important differences from the position of his teacher. 
After his studies Herbart worked as a private tutor for an 
aristocratic family at Bern (1797-1800). There he came into 
contact with Pestalozzi whose pedagogical teachings he later 
helped to propagate [Weiss 1928, 1611. Upon his return to 
Germany, Herbart spent some time at Bremen, completed his doc- 
torate and his Habilitation at Gbttingen, and started to teach 
pedagogy and philosophy. He soon laid down the foundations for 
his metaphysics and his practical philosophy, and as a result, 
he was offered the chair of philosophy formerly held by Kant at 
the University of Kdnigsberg (in 1809). 
Despite his new position, Herbart did not confine himself 
to philosophical teaching. He also founded a pedagogical sem- 
inar which he combined with an experimental school. Between 
1813 and 1815 Herbart was a member of the scientific deputation 
[wissenschaftliche Deputation] at KGnigsberg, one of three re- 
gional scientific advisory boards for educational reform in 
Prussia (the other two boards were at Breslau and Berlin; 
Schleiermacher was a prominent member of the latter). In this 
way Herbart was active in the theory and practice of educational 
reform [24]. 
He was convinced that improvement of scientific, philosoph- 
ical, and cultural education was to play an important role for 
broader political and scoial reforms, because he thought theor- 
etical education of the higher state officials to be a precondi- 
tion for any appropriate reform activity of the state. Moreover, 
education of the citizens was necessary, because only thus would 
they be able to understand fully the meaning of state reform 
and the new opportunities opened by it. 
Herbart was a conservative reformer, as were many other 
German intellectuals of the time, including Goethe. They ex- 
pected a self-reform of the monarchy's state power, which could 
only be prompted by cultural and educational activities. For 
the most part, however, they rejected the idea of social pres- 
sure for reform (while Herbart was in Switzerland, e.g., he 
criticized the democratic radical movement harshly). In 
Herbart's opinion the role of the citizen was to support the 
reform measures applied by the state in agreement with their 
own values prepared by Bildung, and thus in a spirit of "inner 
freedom" [innere Freiheit]. 
In 1834 Herbart took over a chair at Gattingen University 
where he taught philosophy and pedagogy until his death in 
1841. As early as the 182Os, however, the reform in Prussia 
and the other German states had been confronted with the forces 
of restoration and had gradually come to an end. In the 1830s 
and 184Os, after a short interlude of the aborted 1830 demo- 
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cratic revolutionary movement, the states of the German Confed- 
eration adopted a number of laws and measures to repress liberal, 
constitutional, or democratic aspirations. The last remnants 
of liberty of the press were abolished, the secret police con- 
trolled public life, and even the universities were subjected 
to rigorous political control. In this situation reform inten- 
tions could no longer be articulated in public, but were forced 
to take on the form of activities in conspiratorial circles or 
groups which in fact were organized in several universities in 
Germany. Of course Herbart, following his convictions, did not 
take part in these activities. The time of his involvement in 
reform activities had ended with the phase of state reform from 
above. 
The situation was aggravated in 1837 when Ernst August, 
King of Hannover, to which Gijttingen belonged, autocratically 
suspended constitutional rights which had been promised in a 
declaration of 1833. Seven professors (including Gauss' co- 
worker Wilhem Weber) criticized the measure in an open letter 
and were suspended from their positions. This resulted in 
broadly articulated student protests and lively faculty discus- 
sions. Herbart, however, declined to take a public position 
on the question, and preferred to keep the university out of 
political struggle. This was characteristic of Herbart's in- 
creasing alienation from his students in the last part of his 
life, resulting from his continuing rejection of reform activ- 
ities from below, as well as the fact that his hopes for reforms 
from above had reached a dead end. 
After Herbart's death (1841) his pedagogical views were 
diffused widely in Germany and abroad [Lassahn 19781. In dis- 
cussions of pedagogy he is still mentioned, but he is relatively 
neglected today in philosophy. A historical reason for this 
night lie in the fact that Herbart's philosophy led him to the 
fringe of mainstream German idealism which shaped the philosoph- 
ical thinking of his time. This does not, however, explain his 
relative neglect in philosophy today. 
(b) Herbart's Method of Relations [Methode der Beziehungen] 
Herbart considered contradictions in experience and in 
already constituted concepts as the motive force behind their 
creation and modification 11829, 23, ff.]. Contradictions had 
to be resolved by intellectual work resulting in the advance- 
ment of knowledge. Any progress was a transition from a reason 
(e.g., the discovery of a contradiction) to a conclusion [Grund 
und Folge]. The relationship between reason and conclusion, 
however, itself contained a contradiction. The conclusion was 
to be a consequence of the reason and therefore to this extent 
was contained in it. On the other hand it was to be something 
new; otherwise it would only be part of the reason and would 
fail to give any new insight. 
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Herbart described his solution to this problem as the 
"method of relations" [Methode der Beziehunyen] [Herbart 1829, 
24 ff. ;  Weiss 1928, 37 ff.]. In short, he believed that the 
reason in the wider sense was no simple idea. The reason in 
the narrower sense (designated y) had to be linked to elements 
of knowledge not explicitly considered as part of it, thereby 
giving a system of knowledge (denoted G). The conclusion (de- 
noted f) then followed from G. The conclusion f  formed a part 
of G from wh!.ch it had to be separated. This having been done, 
f  contained something new with respect to y. 
This line of thought he held particularly useful for the 
resolution of contradictions in the conceptual system or be- 
tween concepts and experience. In this situaiton the reason' 
was the contradiction and the conclusion was to be the result 
of an appropriate change of the concepts. Now he considered 
the dual aspect of the old concepts (9) and the more involved 
contextual situation which gave rise to the open contradiction. 
According to this general idea Herbart proposed a methodo- 
logical procedure to resolve the contradiction in which the old 
conceptual system was enlarged ("blown up"), thus taking into 
account the more involved contextual situation. From this ex- 
tended structure (G) the essential parts (f) had to isolated 
for a conceptual representation of the distinction which gave 
rise to the contradiction. Thus the contradiction was resolved 
and it led to a changed conceptual system (f) as conclusion. 
The contradiction in the relation between reason and conclusion, 
Herbart argued, was thus a result of the contradictory idea that 
the reason itself is both g and G: "Therefore we say: the 
reason is a contradiction. To blunt the sharpness of this prop- 
osition means to remove all the force from the reason" [251- 
APPENDIX 2: DOCUMENTATION OF FOLIOS 140r AND 141r OF 
FOLDER 18 FROM THE RIEMANN NACHLASS 
(a) Folio 140r 
Herbart ist ausgegangen von der Untersuchung iiber das 
Ph(ilosophieren). Hieraus ergaben sich ihm folgende psycholo- 
gische Postulate, wozu die Erklarungen gesucht werden muBten 
in der nothwendig vorauszusetzenden--und eben dadurch zu erken- 
nenden--Beschaffenheit und Folge der Vorstellungen: 
1. Gegensatz und Ausschliefiungskraft der Vorstellungen 
untereinander. --Dieser Begriff der Vorstellungen selbst als 
Kr;ifte (statt aller vermeintlichen Gemiithskrgfte, welche nichts 
anderes sind als allgemeine Namen fiir Gruppen ;ihnlicher Phsnomene) 
mu@ als die Grundlage der gesammtem Psychologie angesehen 
werden.-- Es gehijrt dazu das Auftreten der Zeitfolge der 
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Vorstellungen [also such . . . (unreadable, E. S.)] als Bedingung 
der Ichheit; weil sonst nur ein stetiges Gleichgewicht aller 
unter einander statt haben kijnnte. 
2. Anheftung des Begriffs der Negation an diejenigen 
Vorstellungen, welche als Bilder gesetzt werden sollen. Aber 
der Begriff der Negation ist, so wenig wie irgend ein anderer 
Begriff, urspriinglich in Bereitschaft: Er mu@ erst erzeugt 
werden. (Das allgemeine Negieren mu6 entstehen aus den 
mancherlei Aufhebungen der Vorstellungen unter einander.) 
3. Anheftung neuer Position, oder des Seins, an die Bilder 
als Bilder (als des inneren Prinzips ihrer Regsamkeit). 
4. Auffindung dieses Seins der Bilder in der Reihe des 
cbrigen, das da sei, und abgebildet wurde; zum Behuf der Sub- 
sumtion. 
(b) Folio 141r 
1. Bildung von Begriffen aus den Wahrnehmungen. (Abstrac- 
tion u. Induction. Synthesis a posteriori.) 
2. Erzeugung der Wahrnehmungen/des Wahrgenommenen aus den 
Begriffen. (Synthesis a priori.) 
3. Maglichst geringe VerXnderung (oder Erg;inzung) der 
Begriffe, wo das Wahrgenommene nach den Begriffen unmijglich 
oder unwahrscheinlich ist. 
In Bezug auf die Synthesis a priori zu scheiden: Woher der 
Antrieb? Woher die Wahrscheinlichkeit? (Biirgschaft) 
Der Antrieb, nach einer ErkXrung zu suchen, liegt in den 
vorgefundenen Begriffen. 
Die Wahrscheinlichkeit beruht auf der Beststigung durch die 
Erfahrung. 
H.W.Bd.4, 594. Die Methode der Beziehungen ist die Methode 
der kleinsten VerZnderungen . . . . "Wenn die Erfahrung sich 
selbst Liigen straft, so miissen wir sie ganz verlassen, nicht 
aber uns riihmen, ihr so nahe als mijglich zu bleiben" 1261. 
Wir brauchen uns gar nicht ernstlich mit der Erfahrung zu 
entzweien, wenn es sich zeigen l;isst, dass die j enige VerZinderung 
der Erfahrungsformen, worauf die Methode der Beziehungen uns 
hinweist, iiberall nicht iiber die Grenzen eines solchen Fehlers 
der Auffassung hinwegfiihrt, den wir der Erfahrung nach gemeiner 
psychologischer Beobachtung fiiglich zutrauen kiSnnen [27]. 
In Bezug hierauf Ps. Bd.2 5139-145 "Von unserer Auffassung 
der Welt und den damit verbundenen Txuschungen" auszuziehen [281 
und die kritischen Einflechtungen auszuschildern. 
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NOTES 
1. Examples of this tendency can be found in the investi- 
gations of Wussing [1969] for the concept of group and Mehrtens 
[1979] for the case of Dedekind. 
2. There is other matherial that would fit the classifica- 
tion less well (e.g., notes to number theory on folios 182-186; 
summation of infinite series, perhaps in preparation for the 
inaugural thesis, folio 208). 
3. "R.n" refers to Riemann Nachlass, Gijttingen Universitats 
bibliothek, folder 18, folio n. 
4. The * in references to Herbart indicates that the cor- 
responding section was studied by Riemann (the appropriate folio 
in question can be found in Table 1). 
5. "The real" [das Reale] in Herbart's usage is determined 
by the fundamental categories "being, quality, inherence, and 
change" [Sein, Qualit;it, InhXrenz, Ver;inderung], as developed 
in his ontology. It is not identical with common-sense reality. 
6. Auf den gegenseitigen Hemmungen der Vorstellungen unter 
einander beruhen die Negationen, und die Zweifel, ob such das 
Wahrgenommene sey oder nicht sey; endlich die Unterscheidungen 
der Eigenschaften, denen nur ein inh;irentes Seyn, und eben 
darum kein wahres Seyn zugeschrieben wird, von den Sachen, in 
welche die RealitZt der Eigenschaften (des ersten Positiven) 
zuriick verlegt wird. 
Die Wanderung der Realit;it aus den Eigenschaften in die 
Sachen ist nur der erste Schritt zu einer weiteren Reise. Auf 
haheren Bildungsstufen entsteht die Frage nach der Einfachheit 
der Stoffe. Wie vorhin den Eigenschaften die Sachen, so werden 
jetzt den Sachen die Elemente entgegengesetzt; diese sind nun 
das wahre Reale; von ihnen haben die Sache eine geliehene 
Realitxt, nicht anders als vorhin die Eigenschaften von den 
Sachen. 
Die Elemente, Feuer, Wasser, Luft, Erde--mtissen sich 
weiterhin die Versuche der Chemiker gefallen lassen. Nun werden 
Sauerstoff, Wasserstoff, Stickstoff, das Reale; hingegen Wasser 
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und Luft, vorhin Elemente, haben nur noch eine geliehene, das 
heiBt, keine wahre Realitat. Jedoch such hiebey bleibt es 
nicht, sondern: 
Der Idealist findet, da6, wie die Eigenschaften, so die 
Sachen, die Elemente, die Grundstoffe des Chemikers, nur 
Anschauungen und Gedanken sind. Dahinter das Ich, welches dem 
Nicht-Ich Realit?it verleiht [Herbart 1825, 199-200; R.5gv, 
italics in the original]. 
7. This is corroborated by the contents of another passage 
of folio 66. Here Herbart criticizes Leibniz' explanations of 
change by movements of monads, giving the counterargument that 
changes in chemistry go much deeper than would be possible 
through changes of mere spatial relations (of monads) [Herbart 
1828, 130*]. 
8. Denn die Mannigfaltigkeit der Irrthiimer iiber Substanzen 
und Krsfte beweis't faktisch, da.8 die Begriffe hiervon im mensch- 
lichen Geiste nicht vest stehn, da$ sie keinesweges Kategorien 
oder angeborene Begriffe sind, sondern wandelbare Erzeugnisse 
eines durch die Erfahrung aufgeregten, durch allerley Meinungen 
umhergeworfenen, Nachdenkens, welches nur dann erst in eine 
sichere und bleibende gberzeugung iibergehn wird, wenn die 
Wissenschaft, Metaphysik genannt, zur Reife gelangt. Wie die 
astronomische Betrachtung, die in die Weiten des Weltbaues 
hinausgeht, so muB such die metaphysische Forschung, welche in 
die Tiefen der Natur hineindringt, mancherley Revolutionen 
durchlaufen, ehe sie so gliicklich ist, solche Begriffe zu 
erzeugen, welche der Erscheinung genugthun, und mit sich selbst 
zusammenstimmen.... 
1st meine Theorie [of substance--of ontology] unrichtig: 
so bestgtigt sie meine jetzige Behauptung, da8 die Begriffe ein 
noch unvollendetes Werk sind; an welchem der menschliche Geist 
fortdauernd arbeitet; sie best;itigt meinen Satz: da8 die 
menschliche Auffassung der Welt im Werden begriffen ist. 
Daraus folgt dann sogleich, da@ such die T&schungen, die 
in diesem Werden nach einander entstehen, sehr mannigfaltig; 
da@ sie den verschiedenen Bildungsstufen angemessen sind, welche 
successiv erreicht werden; da@ sie also in kein Register, etwa 
von Antinomien der reinen Vernunft, sich einschlieBen lassen 
[Herbart 1825, 198-199; R.5qV, italics in the original]. 
9. Die Wahrheit des Bildes ist unabhsngig von dem Grade 
der Feinheit des Bildes; sie hgngt nicht davon ab, ob die 
Elemente des Bildes gr8Bere oder kleinere Mengen des Realen 
reprgsentieren. Aber die Verbindungen miissen einander ent- 
sprechen; es darf nicht im Bilde eine unmittelbare Wirkung 
zweier Elemente aufeinander angenommen werden, wo in Wirklichkeit 
nur eine mittelbare stattfindet. In diesem Fall wiirde das Bild 
falsch sein und der Berichtigung bediirfen; wird dagegen ein 
Element des Bildes durch eine Gruppe von feineren Elementen 
ersetzt, so dass seine Eigenschaften theils aus einfacheren 
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Eigenschaften der feineren Elemente, theils aber aus ihrer 
Verbindung sich ergeben und also zum Theil begreiflich werden, 
SO w;ichst daraus zwar unsere Einsicht in den Zusammenhang der 
Dinge, aber ohne dass die friihere Auffassung fi.ir falsch erkl'drt 
werden miisste [Riemann 1892b, 5231. 
10. Ein zweyter Umstand, den wir aus unserem Verhgltnisse 
zur AuBenwelt hervorheben miissen, ist die Beweqlichkeit des 
Menschen in seiner Umgebunq. Ohne diese wiirden die Anschauungen 
der Dinge stets fiir die Dinge selbst gehalten werden; dadurch 
aber, da@ der Mensch einen Unterschied des Abwesenden und des 
GegenwXrtigen faBt, lernt er, da8 den GegenstZnden ihr 
Erscheinen oder Nicht-Erscheinen zuf?illig ist. Die GegenstBnde 
bekommen, so fern sie vest stehen, such veste PlBtze in seinen 
sich allmshlig bildenden, ordnenden, und verkniipfenden Vorstel- 
lungsreihen, worin die Reihenfolge der Anschauungen aufbewahrt 
wird [Herbart 1824, 425; R.70V, italics in the original]. 
11. Wie der Raum auf abgestuften Verschmelzungen beruht: 
( ,.- ) so erzeugen sich die Vorstellungen von Zhnlichen Con- 
tinuen allemal unter Xhnlichen UmstZnden. Es sey demnach eine 
gewisse Klasse von Vorstellungen so beschaffen, da@, wenn viele 
derselben zugleich im Bewuptsein sind, alsdann aus ihrer Quali- 
t%t bestimmte Abstufungen ihres Verschmelzens erfolgen miissen: 
so ordnen sich unfehlbar diese Vorstellungen dergestalt neben 
und zwischen einander, da@ man sie nicht anders als aufrrFiumliche 
Weise zusammenfassen . . . kann [Herbart 1825, 192; R.141 , italics 
in the original]. 
12. In [1811, 1021 Herbart discussed the one-dimensional 
character of the line of sound by stressing the fact that in it 
"only a single transition" between two states [nur ein einziger 
Ueberqanq durch die s;-inuntlichen dazwischenlieqenden] is possible, 
an explanation which greatly resembles Riemann's own approach 
to the idea of a one-dimensional manifold [Nachlass, folder 16, 
folios 13-141 (compare [Scholz 19831). 
13. Russell's statement that Herbart had a preference for 
the discrete over the continuous, and thereby had an influence 
on Riemann, is plainly misleading. See [Russell 1956, 621 and 
Torretti's criticism of this point [Torretti 1978, 1071. 
14. Diejenige Philosophie, um die es uns zu thun ist, 
liegt gar nicht auBer dem iibrigen Wissen, sondern sie erzeugt 
sich mit und in demselben, als dessen unabtrennlicher Bestand- 
teil; sie had zu demselben ein ganz und gar immanentes Ver- 
hFiltnis [Herbart 1807, 230, italics in the original]. 
15. 1st in der Gesellschaft die vielseitige Kultur 
zerstreut, so kann die richtige Zusammenwirkung der verschiedenen 
Gebildeten nur dadurch gesichert werden, wenn in der hijhern 
leitenden Klasse vie1 Einzelne sind, deren jeder diese Mannig- 
faltigkeit und Bildung in sich selbst besitzt, iiberschaut, 
beherrscht und in der Gesellschaft zu beherrschen wei8. Aber 
das innere Beherrschen der eigenen Vielseitigkeit, die letzte 
Bestimmung und Temperatur kann nur durch die Philosophie bewirkt 
werden.... 
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Die rechte Wirkung der Philosophie auf die Gesellschaft ist 
diejenige, welche durch andere Wissenschaften, die den Berufsge- 
schgften nXher stehen, hindurchgeht. Die Philosophie, der im 
Grunde kein Stoff eigenttilich zugehcrt, hat eben darum eine 
Art von wissenschaftlicher Allgegenwart [Herbart 1807, 300-301, 
italics in the original]. 
16. Es ist namlich die Eigenthiimlichkeit dieser unserer 
Wissenschaft: da8 sie Begriffe zu ihren Gegenstande macht. 
Dagegen sind die iibrigen Disciplinen vertieft im Auffassen 
dessen, was entweder gegeben ist, oder doch gegeben werden 
kbnnte. Selbst die Mathematik (denn von dem historischen Wissen 
ist nicht nathig zu reden), so wie sie pflegt behandelt zu 
werden, denkt sich ihre abstracten Formeln inuner als Formeln 
fiir mijgliche FBlle, und symbolisiert sehr gern ihre Functionen 
durch die Gestalt von Curven, wie sie iiberhaupt den Raum nur 
verl;iBt, urn reicher an Mitteln zur Herrschaft in ihn zuriickzu- 
kehren. Auch kann sie nur in dieser formellen Hinsicht von der 
Philosophie geschieden werden. Philosophisch behandelt, wird 
sie selbst ein Theil der Philosophie, die sich fiir ihr eigenes 
Bediirfni8 eine GraBenlehre wiirde schaffen miissen, wenn noch 
keine vorhanden ware [Herbart 1807, 275, italics in the original] 
17. The first part of folio 177v (folder 18 of Riemann's 
Nachlass) reads as follows: 
Philosophie = Untersuchung der Begriffe 
Phil. Studien; Bd.1 pag. 556 (...) 
(This is the same as [Herbart 18071, E. S.) 
I. Phil(osophische) Ansichten 
II. Speculation = Streben zur Aufldsung der Probleme (...) 
Nachweisung eines nothwendigen Zusammenhangs unter Be- 
griffen 
Problem weiterer Specul(-ation) als Bemiihung zwischen 
den Begriffen die gehErigen fibergxnge zu bahnen. 
III. Philosophie als Wissenschaft 
Allgemeiner Charakter, da6 sie durch Speculation zu 
Stande kommt; dass sie Begriffe zu ihrem Gegenstande 
macht. 
The following part of the folio contains catchwords from the 
index of [Herbart 18071. 
18. On the same page we find a preliminary draft of a 
letter to his father, obviously written shortly after his in- 
augural colloquium. II... Mein Colloquium habe ich am Sonnabend 
Vormittag gliicklich abgemacht...." It is probable that this 
refers to Riemann's inaugural lecture, since (1) it took place 
on Saturday morning [Riemann 1892a, 5481, and (2) another re- 
mark on the same page refers to Leiden bottles, with which 
Riemann worked a short while before and after that lecture. 
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19. Der Mathematiker fiihlt den Beruf, uns den Geist seiner 
geistreichen Formeln zu enthiillen [Herbart 1807, 2311. 
20. Of course Riemann is not the only mathematician for 
whom this characterization would hold (e.g., for Dedekind 
[Mehrtens 19791). Riemann, however, is a particularly outstand- 
ing example. His influence, perhaps even to a certain degree 
on Dedekind, was often substantial. 
21. Herbart's ontology postulated a concept of "the real" 
free from contradictions and change. 
22. Thomas Kuhn's discussion of philosophical influences 
on the formation of the concept of energy [1977] might indicate 
that in the first half of the 19th century there was possibly 
an even wider range of influence of philosophical conceptions 
on science. 
23. For the importance of the French revolution for the 
discussions of the Jena circle to which the young Herbart 
belonged, see [Asmus 1968, 68 ff.]; also see Appendix 1. 
24. As Schubrinq [1981, 191 explains, Herbart concentrated 
in pedagogy on individual education (as was important for pri- 
vate tutors) rather then on group education (as was important 
for the public school system). So his pedagogical ideas contain 
a tension between a sense of reform and conservatism. 
25. Offenbar fordern wir von dem Grunde, da$, indem er die 
Folge erzeugt, er selbst sich Sndert. Seine Materie sol1 sich 
verwandeln in die neue Materie der Folge. Hier kann nicht 
Wahrheit an Wahrheit gekniipft werden, sondern, damit die Folge 
Wahrheit enthalte, muB der Grund das Geqentheil davon sein. 
Seine Verwandlunq dari nicht ein Verlust an Wahrheit seyn; nur 
ein Irrthum,' der sich in nothwendiger Besserunq befindet, kann 
hier den Grund abgeben.... 
Darum sagen wir: der Grund ist ein Widerspruch. Die 
SchZirfe dieser Behauptung abstumpfen, heipt, dem Grunde seine 
Kraft benehmen. Denn die vollkommene Nothwendigkeit, im Denken 
vorwarts zu qehen, findet sich nur da, wo das, was man schon 
denkt, sich selbst aufhebt [Herbart 1829, 36, italics in the 
original]. 
26. This is part of a fictitious citation which Herbart 
used to characterize possible criticism of his method of rela- 
tions that he anticipated from Platonists or Eleatics, etc. 
27. This passage is excerpted from [Herbart 1851, 594-5961. 
28. This refers to [Herbart 1825, 191 ff.], excerpted by 
Riemann on folio 59. 
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